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Abstract
In response to sanitary crisis, risk management has become a central issue for food producers
and distributors in Europe. Organisational responses to sanitary risks usually implying
traceability have been conceived by firms. One of the main tasks here is to deal with
coordination of the different operators of a food chain. The European Union has developed a
regulatory framework with the Regulation 178/2002. This regulation sets a mandatory
traceability considered as a risk management tool. Traceability that was considered as a private
initiative has therefore become an obligation with this regulation. This paper tries to evaluate if
the problem of the operators’ coordination on specific traceability practices that any private
organisational of a food chain had to face is solved with the strict application of the Regulation
178/2002. For that, the analysis characterises the mandatory traceability and the operators’
responsibilities set by the regulation. The coordination task and the problem of trust that it
contains is then described. The analysis shows the limits of the mandatory traceability in this
context and suggests a solution.
JEL Codes: I18, K32, Q18.
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1.   Introduction
In response to sanitary crisis, risk management and signalling safety properties have become
central issues for food producers and suppliers in Europe. Organisational responses usually
implying traceability have been conceived by firms (Bullock and Desquilbet 2002, Mazé 2002,
Ménard and Valceschini 2005, Starbird and Amanor-Boadu 2004). One of the main tasks of
these organisational responses is to deal with coordination of the different operators of a food
chain. The choice of the traceability level depends on that coordination (Souza-Monteiro and
Caswell 2005). At the same time, the European Union has developed a regulatory framework
with the Regulation 178/2002. This regulation is well known for the European Food Safety
Authority it establishes. Together with this Authority, the Regulation 178/2002 sets rules and
procedures in the matter of food safety that aim to create a harmonised food safety system for
the European Communities. In this context, a mandatory traceability appears and is considered
as a risk management tool required for “accurate and targeted withdrawals” of products from
the food chain. Traceability that was considered as a private initiative has therefore become an
obligation with the Regulation 178/2002.542   Traceability, Trust and Coordination in a Food Chain
The paper tries to evaluate if the problem of the operators’ coordination on specific traceability
practices that any private organisational of a food chain had to face is solved with the strict
application of the Regulation 178/2002. For that, the analysis characterises (section 2) both the
mandatory traceability and the information produced (as in Charlier 2005). Together with
traceability, the operators’ responsibilities set by the Regulation 178/2002 are presented. The
coordination task and the problem of trust that it contains is then described (section 3). The
analysis shows the limits of the mandatory traceability in this context and suggests a solution.
2.   Traceability and other new food safety principle
The Regulation 178/2002 sets new obligations for firms with regard to food safety.
Traceability is one of these obligations and will be presented first (2.1). However to be fully
understood, traceability has to be linked to the other obligations on food safety put forward by
the Regulation 178/2002 (2.2).
2.1. The Traceability requirements of the Regulation 178/2002
Precisions on traceability requirements in the Regulation 178/2002 are found in article 18. At
all stages of production, processing and distribution, the necessity of traceability concerns
food, feed, food-producing animals and any other substance intended to be, or expected to be,
incorporated in food or feed. In other words, all inputs of the food production process and the
considered food shall be traced. Consequently, every food and feed business operator is
concerned with traceability, producers and retailers likewise.
For the Regulation 178/2002, the aim of traceability is to “ensure that food or feed business
(…) can identify at least the business from which the food, feed, animal or substance that may
be incorporated into a food or feed has been supplied” (Point 29 of the preamble of the
Regulation 178/2002). The traceability described in article 18 of the Regulation 178/2002
emphasizes therefore that food and feed business operators shall be able to identify any person,
or business client, from whom they have been supplied with a food. This system of traceability
has been called “one step backward and one step forward” for that reason. The information
shall be registered at each stage of production on specific documents. The time this
information should be retained is not specified however. The traceability required by the
Regulation 178/2002 is therefore drawn up step by step. It is never demanded that information
on the content of a food, its origin etc. goes through the production process and the distribution
chain towards the market. The information produced at a stage of production can be confined
at this stage. The different information elements can therefore remain scattered through the
stages of the production process since no more requirements are made in the Regulation 178/
2002. As a consequence, the production process cannot be traced. The traceability request
concerns products only and it is the transactions between the different operators of a
production process that form its base. 
The required traceability is therefore less demanding than a system that would organize
simultaneously the production of information and the transmission of information throughout
the entire production process. This latter system of traceability would be more efficientChristophe Charlier and Egizio Valceschini   543
regarding the sanitary security aim highlighted by the Regulation 178/2002 but it would be
more costly as well since it would require the labelling of every product. The traceability
system asked by the Regulation 178/2002, without any label or document attached with the
product as complement, can only create the framework for a “treasure hunt” for the public
authorities: It is up to them to discover the path of the product. Furthermore, as is pointed out
in the following, this traceability system cannot discriminate goods.
As an illustration, a producer C makes his output with the help of an input supplied by two
producers (  and ). These producers are therefore linked in a vertical relation as shown in
figure 1. Both suppliers sell a batch of input to C:   for supplier 1 and   for supplier 2
respectively. Perfect substitution between the two inputs is supposed. Therefore, producer C
can produce his output from   or   alone, or mixing inputs from the two batches. The set of
the possible input mixings contains therefore three elements:
Finally, producer C sells his product on the final market and to another producer D.
Figure 1. Traceability 
If producer C only meets the traceability requirements of the Regulation 178/2002 (to be able
to identify at least the businesses from which the food inputs have come and the businesses to
which the food has been supplied) the information that he should register consists in two sets. 
The first information set concerning the input he uses contains two elements:  . The
second set of information concerns the output he sells. This set contains the two elements µ
and d, where µ and d mean batches of output sold on the market and to business client D
respectively.
Together with traceability, new dispositions concerning operator’s responsibilities are set in the
Regulation 178/2002. 
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2.2. Operators’ responsibilities
Articles 19 and 20 of the Regulation 178/2002 set responsibilities for food and feed business
operators. Like article 18 for traceability, these articles are put into practice since January
2005. They apply to all stages of production, processing and distribution of food and feed and
fix operators’ obligations concerning food withdrawal, information, and cooperation with
public authorities.
In these two articles, the idea of self-control is the basis of the operators’ obligations. This idea
of self-control appears in the first part of article 17 on responsibilities. Indeed this article states
that “food and feed business operators (…) shall ensure that foods or feeds satisfy the
requirements of food law which are relevant to their activities and shall verify hat such
requirements are met”. The self-control takes therefore the form of a “conformity inspection
requirement”. In accordance with this requirement, articles 19 and 20 point out the crucial role
of operators’ beliefs and private information. It is on the ground of these elements that
operators’ actions are intended to be initiated: “If a food business operator considers or has
reason to believe that a food which it has imported, produced, processed, manufactured or
distributed is not in compliance with the food safety requirements, it shall immediately initiate
procedures to withdraw the food in question from the market (…) and inform the competent
authorities thereof”.
The responsibilities presented in articles 19 and 20 cover three distinct fields. The first one, as
shown in the preceding quotation, is the withdrawal of products from the market. This
operation is placed under the control of the operator who suspects harmful effects on health.
Instead of waiting for authorities’ intervention, the operators are intended to act on their own
initiative. This pro-active behaviour is completed with an obligation to inform authorities. This
forms the second field of responsibilities. It is important to note that this obligation appears
only once private initiative on risk management has been taken. If the product has reached the
consumers, the operators have to inform the consumers “of the reason for its withdrawal”.
Finally, operators are expected to collaborate with authorities on action taken to avoid or
reduce risk, and shall not “prevent or discourage any person from cooperating” with
authorities.
All these requirements do not put light directly on traceability. The capacity to withdraw
products from the market implicitly needs products traceability however. Therefore the pro-
active behaviour put forward by articles 19 and 20 could not be implemented a priori without
traceability. It is important therefore to evaluate if traceability produces enough information to
permit a precise withdrawal of product from the market.Christophe Charlier and Egizio Valceschini   545
3.   Operators’ coordination for traceability
3.1 Traceability for a targeted withdrawal of products
The traceability requirements of the Regulation 178/2002 presented in section one shows that
an operator in the food chain has to be able to identify at least the businesses from which the
food inputs have come and the businesses to which the food has been supplied. Complying
with these requirements implies costs. If the assumption is made that an operator is looking at
the minimisation of these costs, the batches he constitutes, for obvious economic reasons, are
based on the identity of the person to whom they are sold rather than on the mixing of inputs
they have originated from. Producer C for example distinguishes batches m and d. It is
important to note that batch µ, for example, can put together outputs that come from the two
input mixings   and  . As a consequence, the set of information he forms   is not
necessarily a partition of the set of the possible input mixings. As a result, the created
traceability does not allow precise product withdrawal from the market or from the production
process. For instance, if a sanitary problem arises because of input from batch  , both batches
m and d (e.g. the entire production of C) should be withdrawn from the market and the
production process.
To track every unit of output, producer C should differentiate three batches corresponding to
the three different “inputs mixings” he has operated in his production:
 output produced with input from   alone.
 output produced with input from   alone.
 output produced with input from   and  .
The set of output batches should therefore be  . It is important to
notice that DT is the finest partition of set M. This means that each input mixing is isolated in a
subset corresponding to a specific batch. These batches should therefore be registered, in
compliance to Regulation 178/2002, on the basis of the person to whom they are sold. If a
production from a batch is sold to different persons, an equivalent number of batches should be
defined.
The system of traceability created this way thus attaches two dimensions to the batches: their
orientation in the production process (with the identification of the persons who buy them) and
their nature (with their input composition). This system is called in what follows,
“discriminating traceability”, since it can be used to locate precisely each unit of goods in the
production process. If   is sold to producer D and   and   to the market and if a sanitary
() 2 I () 2 1, I I {} δ μ,
1 I
() {} 1 1 I P = 1 I
() {} 2 2 I P = 2 I
() {} 2 1 2 , 1 ,I I P =
1 I 2 I
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1 P 2 P 2 , 1 P546   Traceability, Trust and Coordination in a Food Chain
problem arises because of batch   for instance, only batches   and   should be withdrawn
from the market, whereas   remains in the food chain.
The Regulation 178/2002 however does not impose precise conditions with regard to batches
formation. The discriminating traceability will not therefore appear as the mandatory
traceability. If implemented, it shall be considered as the result, on the one hand of pro-active
behaviours of some operators, and on the other hand of the solution of a coordination problem
that these pro-active behaviours will inevitably be confronted with (3.2). 
3.2 The problem of coordination on specific traceability practices
In a food chain some firms will be more attentive to the requirements on responsibilities that
imply auto control and that requires the capacity to withdraw products from the market. Some
others will be aware of the cost of a sanitary crisis and will choose traceability practices more
stringent than the mandatory one so as to be able to intervene rapidly and to confine the safety
problem. In this perspective the notion of collective reputation is of importance in a food chain.
Indeed, the consumers’ confidence can be broken by wrong practices of few operators and will
affect the other operator’s reputation.
In this context the fact that traceability is required for food and feed by the Regulation 178/
2002 can appear as a good new. The result however is not so straightforward. Indeed, it can be
shown that a single operator can “scramble” the information produced by the other operators of
the food chain while compelling with the requirements of the mandatory traceability.
To show this result, the simple illustration of a food chain is used:
Figure 2.
Two suppliers of raw material have been added (  and  ) in figure (2). They both sell a
batch of their respective raw material to  . This latter is supposed to use these inputs to create
an output sold to his business client C. In this food chain every operator upstream to C is
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supposed to implement a discriminating traceability.   for instance distinguishes three
batches – ,   and  – corresponding to the three raw material mixings
operated. Producer C is supposed to meet the requirement of the mandatory traceability,
without however implementing a discriminating traceability. As a result, he scrambles the
information produced by others while complying with traceability requirements of Regulation
178/2002. If a sanitary problem arises because of batch   of raw material 1, the entire
production of producer C has to be withdrawn from the market. If a discriminating traceability
had been chosen by C, every batches where   does not appear would have remained in the
food chain (i.e. the batches  ,   and  ).
This situation raises a coordination problem among the operators of a same food chain. Indeed
the cost supported by  ,  ,   and   to implement a discriminating traceability is
made useless by the traceability practice of producer C. To avoid this problem the operators
have to coordinate their traceability practices.
The case depicted in figure (2) forms an extreme scenario since only one operator does not
implement a discriminating traceability whereas every firm upstream implement it. Other
cases can of course be conceivable. An interesting case for the rest of the article is the one
where only producer C implements a discriminating traceability whereas all other upstream
firms do not. This case is illustrated with the figure (3).
Figure 3.
In this case, if a sanitary problem appear because of  , the producer C should withdraw
both batches   and  . The entire production of food is not therefore withdrawn from
the market. This result reveals an important characteristic. If a producer does not implement a
discriminating traceability whereas all other producers implement it, he will scramble more
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Before going farther, it is important to note that the possibility to scramble information comes
from two characteristics of the Regulation 178/2002. The first characteristic is that the
information produced by mandatory traceability is insufficient to proceed to targeted
withdrawal of products. If mandatory traceability were sufficiently strong, with precise
conditions for example on the constitution of the batches, this problem of coordination would
not appear. The second characteristic is that the coordination of operators of a food chain is not
considered by the traceability requirements and more generally speaking by the Regulation
178/2002. Two features are particularly salient here. On the one hand, requirements are
addressed to operators considered separately and, on the other hand, the “one-step-forward-
one-step-backward” principle for traceability has the effect to isolate the traceability practice
of an operator from the traceability practices of others. If the first aspect can hardly be avoided
in a regulation text, the second one reveals that the “chain dimension” of the food production
system is not taken into account in the Regulation 178/2002 when defining traceability
requirements.
In front of this result, firms wishing to enhance their traceability for quality and safety reasons
should have to deal with organizational control of the food chain since the result of their effort
depends on the traceability practices of the other operators. This situation raises an immediate
question. Since the private organisation of a food chain is needed for firms that whish to
enhance their risk management practice should we conclude that the Regulation 178/2002 miss
its aim as far as risk management perspective is considered?
3.3. Trust and leadership for traceability
As soon as an important number of inputs enters the production process, implementing a
discriminating traceability becomes illusory. Too many batches should be distinguished from a
practical point of view and the cost of such a policy would probably be unacceptable.
Therefore, firms who wish to enhance their traceability beyond the mandatory one will choose
intermediate forms of traceability permitting to handle the interconnectivity of the different
stages of the food chain (see Hennessy et al. 2003). This task however needs two prerequisites.
The first one is coordination on a traceability practice between firms of the food chain. This
coordination is necessary to determinate how fine the information structure should be. The
second prerequisite is a collective agreement on the definition of the sanitary risks the food
chain faces (see Golan et al. 2004). This common belief should put the different individual
traceability efforts on the same way so as to reach a global coherence. Once these two
prerequisites are met, the traceability implemented along the food chain will be more
informative than the mandatory one. However, it will be less informative than the
discriminating traceability. A perfect-targeted withdrawal of products from the food chain will
not be possible therefore.
Precise recommendations are missing for the intermediate forms of traceability. Indeed, the
two prerequisites directing the traceability practices of the operators form a guide rather than a
traceability standard. As a consequence, an operator cannot know precisely what the
traceability practices of the other operators are. In this situation, an operator is unable to
predict precisely the consequences of the realization of a specific risk. The extent of theChristophe Charlier and Egizio Valceschini   549
withdrawal of his products from the food chain does not depend on his sole traceability but
related to the traceability implemented by the other operators of the food chain. Consequently,
the way the management costs of a sanitary crisis will be shared among the operators of a
chain food is unknown ex ante.
The lack of trust an operator can have confronted to the costs of traceability creates therefore
an incentive problem. A kind of hold up problem on traceability investment appears since the
information produced by an operator with its traceability can be scrambled (partially or totally)
by inadequate traceability practices of the other operators. The operator cannot therefore takes
advantage of its traceability efforts to minimize the ex post costs of risk management. This
situation does not incite the operator to choose ex ante a stringent form of traceability.
In front of this kind of difficulty, the necessity of a private organization of the food chain is
usually put forward (Mazé 2002, Ménard and Valceschini 2005). The described situation
allows being more specific about the difficulty this organization faces. The lack of a
discriminating traceability annuls the possibility to make the products withdrawal from the
market contingent to the realized risk. The private organization of the food chain will therefore
take the form of an incomplete contract. Such an organizational form cannot however be
considered as a direct solution to the problem of under investment on traceability. The
difficulty the operators meet ex ante to foresee what will be ex post the exact repartition of the
cost of the management of a sanitary crisis does not incite them to implement a traceability
more stringent than the mandatory one. To face this problem a form of leadership has to be
decided in the food chain (Hennessy et al. 2001). A leadership hierarchy generating trust in the
food chain can improve the situation strengthening the incentives to invest on traceability. The
role of the leader should be twofold. First, the leader should choose ex ante the traceability
standard that has to be implemented through the food chain. Second, he should be decisive ex
post for the repartition of the burden of the cost of the sanitary crisis management.
Who should be the leader? What should be the criteria allowing to answer this question?
Before presenting elements of response it is interesting to note that far from helping, the
Regulation 178/2002 is likely to complicate matters. Indeed, the dispositions concerning
operators’ responsibilities consider indifferently every operator. Their position and function in
the food chain is never considered as elements that could differentiate their responsibilities.
The preceding analysis however puts light on a particular point. It shows that an operator
located downstream in the food chain has more latitude to scramble the information produced
by other operators’ traceability than an operator located upstream. The idea to bring other
operators’ traceability into line with the traceability implemented by the operator placed at the
end of the food chain would permit to avoid this problem. This line of reasoning argues in
favour of distributors as leader of a food chain. Two other facts put weight on this idea. The
first one is that sanitary risks scarcely come from the distributors’ activity. Sanitary risks more
often come from the inputs employed and the food production process. The second fact
appears when considering reputation. The operator that has an interest to build through time
the reputation to behave non-opportunistically in case of unforeseen events should be chosen
as leader of an incomplete contract (Kreps 1990). This argument clearly points out distributors550   Traceability, Trust and Coordination in a Food Chain
as leader of food chains. A distributor indeed acts as an interface between the food chain and
the consumers. Regarding consumers, a distributor will be interested in building the reputation
to deliver safe food. The reputation for a distributor not to scramble information produced by
others and to behave fairly in front of an unforeseen sanitary crisis should permit him to keep
relations with a food chain and to address to other chains for other kinds of food. All these
elements differentiate the distributors among the operators of a food chain and can be seen as
arguments to give the leadership of a food chain to distributors.
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